Combined Joint Task Force - 101 / CJTF - 101 - Nation Building........from Scratch

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Nation Building........from Scratch

Written by SGM Curtis L. Regan CJTF-82, CJ-3 Bagram, Afghanistan 29 February 2008

Thursday, 28 February 2008

When facing a fanatically persistent
And destabilizing Insurgency

Counter-Insurgency - so easy a caveman could do it. Okay, maybe not that easy. Admittedly, Counter-insurgency operations are inherently complex and place great demands on everyone involved. Nation Building is equally difficult – the complexities even greater when insurgents are allowed to meet political and ideological objectives. Historically U.S. Forces have supported insurgents in toppling oppressive governments, and given the historical success of insurgencies, the task of executing a well-planned counter-insurgency strategy takes on greater significance.

These somewhat unconventional military operations are designed to establish law and order in unstable areas outside of the US and its territories. However, the mere presence of Armed forces certainly does not guarantee stability. Political and military unity is necessary to defeat enemies who oppose a stable and secure environment. The ability of Armed forces to

“The Nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools.” Thucydides

win this Counterinsurgency is directly related to America’s perceived will to deploy its troops as long as necessary to achieve our political objectives. Our Congressional and Legislative bodies must enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of the Nation’s military efforts and leverage interagency and multinational cooperation toward these collective goals.

    The Nation is best served when Congress remains focused toward concrete resolution of all armed conflict. The effectiveness of the Military’s collective efforts overseas speaks well for the institutional soul of today’s Armed Forces. Our values and the laws governing warfare teach us to respect human dignity, maintain our honesty, and do what is right. Adherence to our values distinguishes us from terrorists, insurgents, and other lawless factions. The ultimate success of this Counter-Insurgency Operation depends on maintaining the obligatory value systems in all that we do, and that we continue to occupy the moral high ground, be it with prisoners of war, suspected enemy personnel, or our own countrymen.

    The necessity and required outcome of this conflict remain unchanged. Strong resolute men must remain steadfast in the prosecution of terrorists and insurgent forces and a strong, capable, self-reliant Nation must follow in the wake of fanatical tyranny. Evil must be eradicated, and ideology must be constrained to lawful and legitimate means of debate. Free people must be endowed with the choice of personal religious practices, the pursuit of happiness, and the rewards that come with hard work, creative thinking, and personal expressions of excellence. Coercion, abuse of power, and tyrannical submission of individual rights and liberties cannot go unchecked.

    So where are we? Six years ago, there was no Afghanistan government, there was no Afghanistan President, there was no Afghanistan Army, there was no Afghanistan police force, and there were no Afghanistan border patrols. Criminals did not go in front of duly appointed judges in modern courtrooms, and convicted felons did not go to prison. Afghanistan children did not go to school, young adults did not go to college, and farmers’ produce did not travel to market. Commerce did not flow, engineering projects did not get off the ground, and corruption reigned supreme.

    As a combined joint and multi-national task force, we are intent on increasing interoperability with the fledgling Afghan National Security Forces, fostering regional military professionalism within the Afghan National Army, and demonstrating by

"No great thing is created suddenly, any more than a bunch of grapes or a fig. If you tell me that you desire a fig, I answer you that there must be time. Let it first blossom, then bear fruit, then ripen." Epictetus

example the role of the Afghan National Police in a democracy. Reciprocal military-to-military contact is the primary method of executing these goals. The reciprocity concept means all sides – US Forces, host nation forces, and international partners – participate and benefit.

    This success is especially critical in the company of an unprecedented media presence. The media alone can make the difference between success and failure, particularly in elongated military operations and global campaigns like the ones we are currently engaging in Iraq and Afghanistan. And all at a time when our Allies must trust and have confidence in our efforts - Once this trust is violated, this relationship becomes ineffective.

    Early in this war the enemy shifted from conducting conventional operations to pursuing an insurgent strategy to topple the newly established political system and discredit the duly elected government of Afghanistan. We therefore adapted a strategy to effectively meet this threat. Counter-insurgency operations are complex and require a deep understanding of the enemy and his intent. Additionally, counterinsurgency operations require patience, perseverance, initiative, and discipline to defeat the enemy. Inherent to this success is the essence of our campaign objectives and counter-insurgency operational activities.

    Sustained Armed Forces presence in a region promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic and economic programs can flourish. This sustained presence of strong, capable ground forces is the most visible sign of US commitment – to allies and adversaries alike. But presence alone does not defeat an insurgency, regardless of the length of time and manpower committed to the endeavor. Determining the military actions and civil activities necessary to achieve the desired political end-state is quite challenging in counter-insurgency operations. Success takes years and requires perseverance and a long term commitment to solving the real problems. Conversely, daily operations require rapid and aggressive responses to changing conditions based on localized conflict from competing groups.

    Where do we go from here and how do we succeed in the end? A simple but effective Counter-insurgency strategy executed deliberately and consistently over a protracted period of time, with professional poise and steadfast determination from all elements of security and support.

The three essential principles of Counter-Insurgency include separating the insurgents from the people, building capacity within the Government, and strengthening the Nation as a whole. In simpler terms, Clear, Build, Hold, and the associated tasks that support each phase in terms of physical and moral dimensions.

Clear	Build	Hold
Physical	Physical	Physical
Disrupt Disable Dislocate Eliminate Attrit Reduce Isolate Degrade	Enhance Construct Peotect Develop ConstructCapability Enhance Capicity Build	Expand Enhance Stabilize Durability
Moral	Moral	Moral
Destabilize Debilitate Disassociate Disconnect Discerdit Seperate Undermind	Legitimize Empower Enable Foster Support Form Vitalize Invigorate	Support Promote Enable Sustain Uphold Empower Enbolden Persist

Counter-insurgency operations are inherently complex and place especially great demands on small units and small unit leaders. These leaders are required to develop interpersonal skills such as cultural awareness, negotiating techniques, and important language phrases while maintaining critical war-fighting skills. They must also remain calm and exercise superb

The future belongs to those who believe in the beauty of their dreams. –ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, US diplomat and politician, 1884-1962

judgment under considerable pressure. Soldiers and units at every level must be flexible and adaptive. These operations require leaders with the mental and physical agility to shift from noncombat to combat operations and back again in an instant.

    Given the volatile and politically charged nature of these operations, individual and small unit actions can have consequences disproportionate to the level of command or amount of force involved. In some cases individual actions can have strategically altering affects. Every Soldier must understand the operational and strategic context of the mission and the potential military, political, and legal consequences of their actions or inactions. Recognizing and avoiding potential problems requires trained and disciplined leaders and Soldiers at every level.

    These Counter-Insurgency operations on both sides of the conflict occur in the public view. This includes continuous observation by domestic and international media as well as face-to-face interaction with the local population. Knowing this, opponents will size on relatively minor incidents to achieve political advantages. Potentially, a single act of indiscipline or rash application of force can undo months or even years of disciplined efforts. Likewise, actions that are destructive to the natural or cultural environment may introduce negative perceptions that must be overcome at a later date. The intent is to demonstrate strength and resolve without provoking an unintended consequence.

     Leaders develop the individual integrity of their Soldiers by teaching the imperatives and characteristics of Counter-Insurgency operations, maintaining disciplined and cohesive units and reinforcing these professional attributes at the

“You must show the unlearned man the truth, and you will see that he will follow. But so long as you do not show him, you should not mock, but rather feel your own incapacity.” Epictetus

highest readiness level possible. The essence of these individual attributes consist of consummate professionalism, strength of character, dedicated excellence, determination and singularity of purpose, unity of effort, steadfast commitment, selfless service, diligence and obedience to orders, and discipline and perseverance in the face of adversity. These cavemen have come a long way.

Last Updated ( Wednesday, 07 May 2008 )

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